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I. Introduction

December 18, 2001 marked a historic day in Russia's'
legislative and legal history. After years of tedious drafting and
revising by the Duma's Legislation Committee,2 President
Vladimir Putin signed into law the new Russian Federation Code
of Criminal Procedure(CCP) into law.' Prior to the enactment of
the CCP, the pre-glasnost4 Soviet-era Code of Criminal Procedure
of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR)5

governed criminal procedure in post-communist Russia. The
Soviet laws remained in effect as long as they were not contrary to
or replaced by new laws. 6 This situation created a confusing
asymmetry between the rights of Russian citizens as enumerated
in the 1993 Constitution7 and their rights in practice under the
Soviet laws of criminal procedure.8 The provisions of the new
CCP, however, have finally aligned the rules governing Russia's
criminal investigation and trial process with many of the more

I The name of the republic was officially changed from the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR or the Soviet Union) to the Russian Federation on
December 25, 1991. Vedomosti Fed. Sobr. RF, 1991, No. 2, Item 62, in II-B THOMAS H.
REYNOLDS & ARTURO A. FLORES, Russia, in FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT SOURCES OF CODES
AND LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD 1, 22 n. 1 (2002).
2 The Duma is the larger and more powerful body of the Russian Parliament. See
11-B THOMAS H. REYNOLDS & ARTURO A. FLORES, Russia, in FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT
SOURCES OF CODES AND LEGISLATION INJURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD 1, 17 (2002).
3 See Christopher Lehmann, Introduction to UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL'NYI
KODEKS RF [UPK RE] (Russ). (Dep't of Justice trans). (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript
at 6-7, on file with author).
4 "Glasnost," which means "openness," refers to the series of radical reforms
ushered in by President Gorbachev in the late 1980s. THOMAS F. REMINGTON, POLITICS
INRUSSIA 40 (2d ed. 2002).
5 UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL'NyI KODEKS RSFSR [UPK RSFSR] (1960) (amended
1972) (Russ)., in SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES 203
(Harold J. Berman & James W. Spindler trans., 1972).
6 REYNOLDS & FLORES, supra note 2, at 8-9, 16-17.
7 RUSS. CONST., reprinted in RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF A

RULE-OF-LAW STATE AND A MARKET ECONOMY 1 (William E. Butler & Jane E.
Henderson eds., 1998).
8 Leon Aron, Russia Reinvents the Rule of Law, RUSSIAN OUTLOOK, Mar. 20,
2002, at 9; Scott Boylan, Rule of Law in the Criminal Sphere: Long Awaited Russian
Criminal Procedure Code is Enacted, 7 RUSSIA WATCH 10, 10 (2002), available at
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/Russia-Watch_7.pdf.
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liberal provisions of the 1993 Constitution. 9
More specifically, the CCP has dramatically altered the roles
of procurators, judges, and defense attorneys in the Russian
criminal justice system,1" converting the previous inquisitorial
method of criminal procedure into a more adversarial process.1 1
The CCP greatly diminishes the almost absolute power previously
held by the procuracy, 2 transfers a substantial amount of power to

the courts, 3 and creates a significantly expanded role for defense
1
attorneys.
Although the passage of the CCP represents a revolution in
Russian criminal procedure jurisprudence, 4 the scholarly

discussion of the CCP has been confined to a comparison of some
of the most liberal provisions of the CCP with their American
counterparts 1 5 and a case study of the jury trial initiative in
Sakhalin.16 Due to the large number of significant reforms of the
Russian criminal justice system that the CCP envisions, a critical
analysis of the success of the implementation of the entire CCP is
9

Lehmann, supra note 3, at 6; Boylan, supra note 8, at 10.

See, e.g., Russ.

CONST.arts. 22(2) (authorizing arrests and detentions only upon court order and limiting

detentions without a court order to 48 hours), 23(2) (authorizing the violation of the
privacy of correspondence only upon court order), 25 (authorizing the search of private
residences only pursuant to instances established by federal law or a court order), 46(1)
(right to defend rights and liberties in court), 48 (right to counsel), 49(1) (innocent until
proven guilty), 50(1) (no double jeopardy), 51(1) (no self-incrimination), 120(1)
(independence of judges), 12 1(1) (judges irremovable), 122(1) (judicial immunity from
prosecution), 123 (adversarial proceedings and jury trials), & 124 (funding of courts
from the federal budget).
10 See Aron, supra note 8, at 10 (discussing how key provisions of the CCP
increase the power of the judiciary and decrease the power of the procuracy).
11 See id. at 11.

12 The term "procuracy" refers to Russian prosecutors. Peter H. Solomon, Jr. &
Todd S. Foglesong, The Procuracyand the Courts in Russia: A New Relationship?, 9 E.
EUR. CONST. REv., 105, 105 (2000).
13 See Aron, supra note 8, at 11.
See Lehmann, supra note 3, at 6.
15 See Leonard Orland, A Russian Legal Revolution: The 2002 CriminalProcedure
Code, 18 CONN.J. INT'LL. 133 (2002).
16 See Paul J.De Muniz, Judicial Reform in Russia: Russia Looks to the Past to
Create a New Adversarial System of Criminal Justice, 11 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. &
Disp. RESOL. 81 (2004) [hereinafter De Muniz, Judicial Reform in Russia]; Paul J. De
Muniz, Realizing the Rule of Law: Jury Trials Come to the Russian FarEast, 63 OR. ST.
B. BULL., Feb./Mar. 2003, at 11 [hereinafter De Muniz, Realizing the Rule of Law].
14
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beyond the scope of this Comment. Instead, this Comment will
focus upon the narrower question of how effectively the CCP has
reallocated power among procurators, judges, and defense
attorneys during the two years following its implementation. 7
First, this Comment examines the roles of procurators, judges,
and defense attorneys in the Soviet criminal justice system and
how their roles began to change after the collapse of communism.
Second, this Comment sets out the guiding principles behind the
promulgation of the CCP and discusses how the relevant CCP
provisions have the potential to dramatically alter the powers and
duties of procurators, judges, and defense attorneys in today's
criminal justice process. Third, this Comment critically analyzes
how effectively these new provisions have been implemented,
highlighting both victories and shortcomings. Finally, in light of
those victories and shortcomings, this Comment determines the
current success and the potential for continued and increased
efficacy in reaching a fair distribution of power among
procurators, judges, and defense attorneys in the Russian criminal
justice system.
II. Background
A. CriminalProcedurein the Soviet Union
Like everything else in the Soviet Union, the judicial system
was a political tool of the Communist Party, and the justice meted
out was the justice authorized by the Communist Party. 8
Following the 1917 Revolution, the Bolsheviks refused to use
tsarist legal officials in their legal system and, instead, staffed their
legal agencies with politically affiliated amateurs. 9 When this
arrangement failed to produce a pliant, reliable cadre of legal
officials, the Communist Party insisted not only that legal officials
obtain Party membership, but also that they pursue government-

17 Russia's Putin Signs Law on Amendments to Criminal Code, BBC MONITORING,

July 6, 2003, available at 2003 WL 58752857 (stating that the CCP went into effect on
July 1, 2002).
18 See Aron, supra note 8, at 1; Boylan, supra note 8, at 10 ("IT]he old... Soviet
procedure code.., was... to facilitate the authoritarian power of one of the most
tyrannical regimes in the history of the world.").
19 PETER H. SOLOMON, JR., SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER STALIN 4 (1996).
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controlled legal education and careers in legal service. 20 As a
result of this endless political indoctrination, local Party politicians
were able to intervene in all areas of the criminal justice system in
order to serve the regime's, as well as their own personal, needs. 2'
The distribution of power in the Soviet criminal justice system
was skewed drastically in favor of the procuracy.22 Considered the
most prestigious members of the legal profession, the procurators23
possessed vast powers far superior to that of U.S. prosecutors
and belonged to the political elite, wielding significantly more
political power than judges and defense attorneys.24 Procurator
duties included: (1) supervising the entire justice system; (2)
upholding the rights of both the state and individuals accused of a
crime; (3) investigating crimes; and (4) prosecuting crimes.25
Outside of the courtroom, the procuracy functioned as the
principal check on official illegality and abuses of power. 26 The
Law on the Procuracyof the USSR27 entrusted the procuracy with
supreme supervision over the uniform execution of the laws by all
entities and persons in the Soviet Union.28 In fact, the procurator's
power to monitor official compliance with the law and the Party
line even allowed him to monitor judicial conduct. 29 Through his
power of "general supervision," the procurator monitored the
production of laws issued by lower levels of government and
received, processed, and investigated citizen complaints.3 ° In
addition, procurators were responsible for monitoring both the
20

Id.

21

Id. at 5.

22 See THOMAS F. REMINGTON, POLITICS IN RUSSIA 211 (1st ed. 1999); see also
Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 105-06 (detailing the reasons for the superior
position of the procuracy in the Soviet criminal justice system).

23 REMINGTON, supra note 22, at 211.

24 Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 106.
25 REMINGTON, supra note 22, at 206; Aron, supra note 8, at 2.
26 REMINGTON,

supra note 22, at 211.

27 Law on the Procuracy of the USSR, Vedomosti SSSR, 1979, No. 49, Item 843,
amended by Vedomosti SSSR, 1982, No. 49, Item 935, in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON THE
SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 173 (W.E. Butler ed. & trans., 1983).
28 Id. art. 1.
29 Aron, supra note 8, at 2.
30 Law on the Procuracy of the USSR, art. 3; Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12,
at 105.
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police and the penal system3 and for reviewing the work of the
investigators who prepared criminal case files.3 2 Procurators also
powers over arrest, search and seizure, and pretrial
had unchecked
33
detention.
Moreover, the vast powers and political prestige of the
procuracy significantly influenced the conduct of Soviet criminal
trials.34 The Soviet criminal justice system was based upon the
inquisitorial (or Continental) model adopted in tsarist Russia.35 In
this model, a judge actively sought to determine the truth in a
particular case based upon an oral review of the evidence
contained in a written case file.36 A neutral judicial investigator,
similar to the juge d'instruction in France, conducted the initial
pretrial investigation, including both inculpating and exculpating
evidence in the case file for the judge's review. 37 But the Soviet
model skewed this process in favor of the prosecution, because the
investigators were officials of the procuracy rather than of the
courts.38 Working under the direct supervision of the procurators,
investigators could not maintain their independence and neutrality
and, hence, conducted pretrial investigations and compiled case
files in such a way so as to assist the procurators in convicting
defendants.39 As a result, the courts, judges, and defense attorneys
constituted a mere backdrop to the procurator's virtually inevitable
conviction of the defendant.4 °
After assigning a criminal case to a judge, the procurator often
failed to appear at trial, because he trusted that the judge would
31 Law on the Procuracy of the USSR, art. 3; REMINGTON, supra note 22, at 211;
Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 105.
32 PETER H. SOLOMON, JR. & TODD S. FOGLESONG, COURTS AND TRANSITION IN
RUSSIA: THE CHALLENGE OF JUDICIAL REFORM 144 (2000).
33 Aron, supra note 8, at 2; Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 105.

34 See Aron, supra note 8, at 2.
35 REMINGTON, supra note 22, at 212 note 13; SOLOMON & FOGLESONG, supra note
32, at 142-43.
36 REMINGTON, supra note 22, at 212 note 13; SOLOMON & FOGLESONG, supra note
32, at 142-43.
37 SOLOMON & FOGLESONG, supra note 32, at 142-43.

38 Id. at 143.
39 Id. at 143-44.

40 See Aron, supra note 8, at 2.
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find the defendant guilty.41 If the judge determined that the
evidence was unusually weak, he returned the case to the
procurator for supplementary investigation (dosledovanie).4 z After
the completion of such additional investigation, the defendant
stood trial for the same crime.43 In addition, as a part of his
supervisory responsibilities, the procurator had the right to review
the legality of any decision, verdict, or sentence that had entered
into legal effect, including an acquittal. 4 This supervisory power
had two effects: first, it resulted in an acquittal rate of less than
one percent of all verdicts, 45 and second, it gave procurators the
power to have sentences they considered too lenient rescinded and
replaced with harsher punishments.46 As a result, the procurators
dominated courtroom proceedings by controlling both the
information provided in the case files and the appellate process,
thus placing judges and defense attorneys in an extremely
subservient and dependent position.47
In direct contrast to the vast powers possessed by the
procuracy, the power of the Soviet judiciary was virtually nonexistent. 48 Although members of the Communist Party, Soviet

41

Id.; see Orland, supra note 15, at 145.

42

Aron, supra note 8, at 2.

43 Id.
44 Law on the Procuracy of the USSR, Vedomosti SSSR, 1979, No. 49, Item 843,
art. 33, amended by Vedomosti SSSR, 1982, No. 49, Item 945, in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON
THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 173 (W.E. Butler ed. & trans., 1983) ("The right to bring
cassational and private protests against illegal and unfounded decisions, judgments,
rulings, and decrees shall belong to the procurator and deputy procurator within the
limits of their competence irrespective of their participation in the examination of the
case in the court of first instance."); Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 106.
45 See Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 106 (discussing how acquittal rates
dropped from 10% to 2-3% in the late 1940s and then eventually to a fraction of 1% in
the 1960s).
46 Elena Barikhnovskaya, How the Constitutional Court is Reforming Criminal
Procedure: The Nikitin Case, 9 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 99, 101 (2000) (discussing how
high-level procurators can submit a "protest" to certain high courts requesting the
reversal of an acquittal or a criminal sentence which they consider too lenient); cf. Aron,
supra note 8, at 2 (describing the 1960s Rokotov-Faibishenko case, in which Secretary
Khrushchev had the law changed so that the death penalty applied to currency crimes,
resulting in the re-sentencing and execution of two defendants).
47 See Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 106.
48 See REMINGTON, supra note 22, at 213.
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judges did not enjoy the elevated status and power of the
procurators.49 In fact, judges generally had the least experience
and were the lowest-paid officials in the legal profession. ° Due to
their disfavored status, Soviet judges lacked the political standing
to play a meaningful role in the criminal justice process."
Soviet judges remained in a position of subservience because
of inadequate financing, insecure tenure, and a lack of control over
the administration of the courts.5 2 Judicial salaries were "barely
adequate" and judges rarely received substantial non-monetary
perks, an important salary supplement in the communist system. 3
The local Party apparatus determined a judge's tenure in office by
recommending or not recommending the judge in a singlecandidate election. 4 Party officials based judicial retention
decisions on a judge's "stability of sentences." 55 Frequent
reversals could result in a judge not being reelected or promoted,
In addition, judges
or even in disciplinary proceedings. 6
exercised little control over the administration of the courts;
instead, the Ministry of Justice controlled court budgets and wrote
that determined a judge's chances for
the performance evaluations
7
career advancement.
As a result, Soviet judges became the mere puppets of the local
49 Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 106.

50 REMINGTON, supra note 22, at 213; see also Aron, supra note 8, at 1-2 (stating
that most Soviet judges in the 1970s and 1980s could not afford their own apartments,
living instead with their family in a single room in a communal apartment or dormitory).
51 See Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 106.
52 See Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Judicial Power in Russia: Through the Prism of
Administrative Justice, 38 L. & Soc'Y REv. 549, 549 (2004) (emphasizing that these
three factors constitute the basis of an independent judiciary) (hereinafter Solomon,
Judicial Power in Russia]; Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Putin's Judicial Reform: Making
Judges Accountable as Well as Independent, 11 E. EuR. CONST. REv., 117, 118 (2002)
(highlighting these three factors as institutional mechanisms developed by democratic
governments to insulate judges from outside influences) [hereinafter Solomon, Putin's
JudicialReform].
53 SOLOMON & FOGLESONG, supra note 32, at 7.
54 Aron, supra note 8, at 1.
55

SOLOMON & FOGLESONG, supra note 32, at 7.

56 Id. (discussing how reversal ratings weighed heavily in the performance ratings,

possible bonuses, reputations, and future careers of Soviet judges).
57 Id. (describing the derelict condition of the Soviet court buildings and how funds
barely paid for staff needs).

2004]

NEW RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Party apparatus, subservient to the demands of the local Party
elite.58 Because the judges depended upon the local Party bosses
for the financial support of the courts, non-monetary perks, and
career advancement, they assumed an extremely passive role in the
criminal justice system, acceding to the demands of the politically
powerful procurators. 9 For example, during criminal trials, Soviet
judges cooperated with the procurators to obtain convictions,6"
assuming the role of assistant prosecutors rather than neutral
arbiters of the law.61 This contributed to the aforementioned low
acquittal rate" and diminished judicial self-esteem and
competence.63
Soviet defense counsel, known as advocates (advokatura),
shared the lowly status of Soviet judges in the criminal justice
system. 64 Advocates also maintained Party membership and were
controlled by the Ministry of Justice. 65 Defense attorneys had no
right to be involved in the pretrial investigation of their clients'
cases, could not conduct their own parallel investigations, and had
no access to the case file until after the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation.66
The defense attorneys' lack of
autonomy and pretrial investigation rights significantly impaired
their ability to effectively represent their clients in criminal
proceedings and, like Soviet judges, rendered them mere
accessories to the procurator's inevitable conviction of the
defendant.67
Consequently, the criminal justice system in the Soviet Union
operated merely as another instrument of Communist Party

58 See Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 106.
59 Id.

60 See id. (describing judicial cooperation in politically sensitive cases, in which
judges acted in a biased manner during the trial and always returned the verdicts and
sentences that would satisfy the KGB).
61 See REMINGTON, supra note 22, at 215.
62 Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 106.
63 See REMINGTON, supra note 22, at 213.

64 See id. at 220.
65

Id.

66 SOLOMON

& FOGLESONG, supra note 32, at 144.

67 See REMINGTON, supra note 22, at 220.
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control.68 Criminal trials produced little more than sham justice,
because Soviet judges almost always deferred to the wishes of the
powerful procurators, whose power to convict was virtually
unchecked. 69 Defendants enjoyed no presumption of innocence
and no protection from double jeopardy, as defendants could stand
trial for the same charges multiple times until they were
convicted.7" In addition, defendants possessed only a right to
Party-controlled counsel and, therefore, defense attorneys played
no significant adversarial role in the Soviet criminal process.71
The cultural legacy of the Soviet criminal justice system consisted
of an unequal power distribution among judicial actors72 and a
societal perception that courts were not the protectors of individual
rights.73
B. CriminalProcedurein the Russian Federation
President Mikhail Gorbachev's introduction of glasnost in the
late 1980s exposed the unfairness and impotence that
characterized the entire Soviet criminal justice system, stimulating
governmental interest in developing procedural reforms for the
justice system.74 As a result, two major advances in Russian legal
jurisprudence occurred in 1991." First, the legislature passed a
law creating the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, a
judicial entity autonomous from the control of the executive and
legislative branches.76 The Constitutional Court had the authority
to rule on the constitutionality of international treaties, laws of
Russia's republics, federal laws, and the laws, codes, and
regulations governing the legal system.77 Second, nine Russian
68 See Aron, supra note 8, at 1.

69 See id. at 2.
70 See id.
71 See REMINGTON, supra note 22, at 220.

72 Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 105.
supra note 22, at 214.
74 Aron, supra note 8, at 2-3; Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 106.
75 See Aron, supra note 8, at 3.
76 Id. Although the Constitutional Court constitutes a very interesting component
of the current Russian legal system, an in-depth analysis of its composition, function, and
efficacy is beyond the scope of this Comment.
73 REMINGTON,

77 Id.
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jurists78 wrote a 100-page manifesto entitled The Conception of
79 which the Supreme
JudicialReform in the Russian Federation,
°
Soviet of Russia adopted as the blueprint for a comprehensive
and radical reform of the post-communist legal system.81 The
authors advocated for a reallocation of the distribution of power in
the criminal justice system between the procurators and the judges
in order to eliminate the courts' traditional deference to
procurators and dependence on the state.82 More importantly, the
manifesto proposed specific changes to the current system83 which
would dramatically reduce the power of the procuracy.84
But most jurists and politicians, and especially the procurators
themselves, did not share the views expressed by the authors of the
Conception and the procuracy largely succeeded in safeguarding
its powers of general supervision.85 Procurators retained the
power to review "the rights and freedoms of the person and the
citizen" and the implementation of laws.86 But procuratorial
supervision has since been limited to officials and state agencies,
and procurators no longer have the express power to supervise the

78 The jurists consisted of lawyers and legal scholars, who were largely specialists
in criminal procedure. Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 106.
79 The Conception of JudicialReform in the RSFSR, 30 STATUTES AND DECISIONS:
THE LAWS OF THE USSR AND ITS SUCCESSOR STATES 9 (1994).

80 The Supreme Soviet was the legislative body of the Soviet government, both
during the height of communist power and during the transitional period under President
Gorbachev. David MacKenzie & Michael W. Curran, A History of Russia, the Soviet
Union, and Beyond 611 (5th ed. 1999).
81 Aron, supra note 8, at 3; Solomon & Foglesong, supranote 12, at 106.
82 Aron, supra note 8, at 3; Solomon & Foglesong, supranote 12, at 106.
83 See Aron, supra note 8, at 3 (calling for life tenure of judges, disciplinary and
removal power over judges to rest with peer associations, payment of judicial salaries
from the federal budget, guaranteed housing and health care for judges, judicial review
of administrative acts, judicial rather than procuratorial assurance of trial legality, and
exclusive judicial authorization of pretrial detention, wiretapping, and search and
seizure).
84 Id.; Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 106.
85 Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 106; see also Boylan, supra note 8, at
11 (noting that the procurators opposed the recommended reforms because they would
dramatically reduce the power of procurators and police to deal with rising crime levels
as efficiently as in the past).
86 Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 107.
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legality of criminal trials." Although the 1992 Law on the
88 does not refer to the
Procuracy of the Russian Federation
procurator's responsibility to supervise the execution of the law at
trial,8 9 superiors still expect procurators to utilize all legal means to
In addition, procurators
ensure compliance with the law.9 °
retained their powers of supplementary investigation and the right
to review any verdict already in effect.9 1
Despite the procuracy's stubborn resistance to liberal reforms,
the 1993 Constitution, ratified during the Yeltsin administration,
contains a number of liberal legal provisions that redistribute
many of the procuracy's former duties to the judiciary in law, if
not in practice.92 Significantly, the Constitution states that
procurators must seek judicial approval before eavesdropping,
initiating pretrial detention, and conducting searches and
seizures.93 However, these provisions remained ineffective for
nearly a decade until the new CCP came into effect on July 1,
2002. 9" The provisions of the 1993 Constitution make judges
irremovable and independent, dictate that court funding is to be
obtained solely from the federal budget, and declare that trial
87

Id.

Federal Law on the Procuracy of the Russian Federation, Vedomosti Fed. Sobr.
RF, 1992, No. 8, Item 366, amended by Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 47, Item 4472, in
88

RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF A RULE-OF-LAW STATE AND A MARKET

ECONOMY (William E. Butler & Jane E. Henderson eds., 1998) [hereinafter Federal Law
on the Procuracy of the Russian Federation].
89 Compare Law on the Procuracy of the USSR, Vedomosti SSSR, 1979, No. 49,
Item 843, art. 3, amended by Vedomosti SSSR, 1982, No. 49, Item 945, in BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 173 (W.E. Butler ed. & trans., 1983) ("The
Procuracy of the USSR shall... function according to the following basic
orientations: ... supervision over the execution of laws when cases are considered in
courts .... "), with Federal Law on the Procuracy of the Russian Federation, art. 21
(noting the absence of a provision regarding the supervision of the execution of laws
when cases are considered in court).
90 Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 107 (referring to Order No. 44 of 1994
from the Procurator General, which states that the absence of the duty to supervise
legality in trials "in no way means that the procurator show indifference to actual
violations of the law"). Procurators are supposed to petition the judge and/or make
cassational protests if they observe any violations of the law. Id.
91 Id.
92 See id.; Russ. CONST., supra note 7.

93 Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 107.
94 Id.
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proceedings are competitions between equal players, thus securing
significant victories for both judges and defense attorneys. 95
Furthermore, beginning with the 1992 Law on the Status of
Judges in the Russian Federation,96 the government began to pass
a series of laws that addressed the funding, tenure, and control
issues that undermined the independence of the judiciary during
the Soviet period. 97 First, judicial salaries increased to several
hundred dollars per month, comparable to that of middle rank
government officials, and the quality of non-monetary benefits
But judicial salaries remained low
packages improved. 98
of Western judges and other Russian
salaries
compared to the
99
professionals, and the severe financial fluctuations of the 1990s
made it difficult for courts to obtain the promised federal funding,
forcing courts to turn to local governments for supplementary
funding. 00 As a result, judges remained susceptible to control and
pressure by local authorities and politicians01
Second, a series of laws began to eliminate judicial concerns
with tenure and career advancement.0 2 Most judges in Russia
now hold office for life until they reach a mandatory retirement
age.1" 3 In addition, regional conferences of judges (collegia) have
assumed many of the judicial regulatory powers previously
exercised by the executive or legislative branches of government

95 See Aron, supra note 8, at 3-4.
96 Law on the Status of Judges in the Russian Federation, Vedomosti RSFSR,
1992, No. 30, Item 1792, amended by Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 26, Item 23991, in
RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF A RULE-OF-LAW STATE AND A MARKET

ECONOMY 234 (William E. Butler & Jane E. Henderson eds., 1998).
97 See Aron, supra note 8, at 4.
98 Id. at 5 (adding that compensation packages now included access to apartments
as well as health and child care).
99 Id. (stating that although judicial salaries increased, judicial salaries were only
comparable to the salaries of middle-rank government employees).
100 Id.; Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 107.
101 Aron, supra note 8, at 5.
102 See id. at 4; Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 107.
103 Aron, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that life tenure begins after judges successfully
complete a probationary period, which is ten years in length for judges appointed in 1992
and 1993 and three years for judges appointed after 1995); Solomon & Foglesong, supra
note 12, at 107. By 1998, almost 25% of Russian judges enjoyed life tenure. Aron,
supra note 8, at 4.
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and perform many self-regulatory functions. 04
The judicial
collegias elect regional councils of judges, nominate delegates to
attend the national Congress of Judges, and establish judicial
qualifications collegias (JQCs). °5 Only the JQCs can remove a
judge's immunity from recall, dismissal, or prosecution, and the
Russian President may appoint district and regional judges only
after the JQCs and the
Supreme Court have examined and
10 6
endorsed the nominees.
Third, the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court, an entity
wholly separate from the Ministry of Justice, now controls the
administration and management of the Russian court system. 107
The Judicial Department manages and distributes government
funding to the courts.' ° In addition, the total separation of the
Judicial Department from the executive branch has greatly
enhanced judicial autonomy and independence. 9
The flurry of legal reforms in the 1990s brought mixed
results." 0 Although the acquittal rate did not increase, the number
of cases lost by the State increased modestly."' Moreover, judges
increasingly returned cases to the procurators for further
investigation and even terminated certain trials for various
reasons." 2 In addition, a 1999 ruling by the Constitutional Court
narrowed the grounds for conducting a supplemental investigation
by permitting supplemental investigations only if the procedural
laws governing pretrial investigation were violated." 3 The reasons
for the decrease in successful prosecutions were twofold: first, illqualified procurators failed to adequately prepare cases before
sending them to trial, and4 second, judges began to take bolder
actions in the courtroom.'
104 Aron, supra note 8, at 4.

105 Id.
106

Id.

107

Id.; Soloman & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 107.

108

Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 107.

109

Aron, supra note 8, at 4.

110 See Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 107-08.
"'l Id. (noting
112

that the acquittal rate remained below 1%).

Id.

113 Aron, supra note 8, at 7; see SOLOMON & FOGLESONG, supra note 32, at 150.

114 Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 108.
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Despite these tentative steps towards a more equitable and
adversarial legal system, the Russian criminal process remained
procurator-centered." 5 Many judges continued to view their role
in the criminal justice system as procuratorial adjuncts in the fight
against crime." 6 Due to the erratic availability of federal funding
throughout the 1990s, many courts remained subservient to the
whims of local political authorities in order to obtain the
supplemental funding they needed to carry out their duties." 7
Although several of the provisions of the 1993 Constitution and
many of the proposed legal reforms threatened to curtail the power
of the procuracy, the procurators still managed to preserve most of
their vast powers of investigation, prosecution, and supervision of
the laws." 8 Despite their incomplete implementation, the reforms
of the 1990s had begun to break down the old Soviet criminal
justice system and replace it with a more Westernized, adversarial
model. These reforms paved the way for President Vladimir
Putin's ambitious agenda of radical legal reforms in 2001."'
III.The Russian Federation Code of Criminal Procedure
A. Goals of the New CCP
As stated earlier, Duma deputies drafted the CCP to replace
the antiquated Soviet version that dated back to the 1960s.1 20 The
provisions of the new CCP theoretically bring the law of criminal
procedure into compliance with the 1993 Constitution, eliminating
the prior inconsistencies between rights guaranteed in the
Constitution and the actual operation of the old Soviet criminal
justice system. 2 ' Upholding the CCP as the "cornerstone" of
judicial reform in Russia, 22 the drafters of the CCP sought to
115

Seeid.

116 Id.
117

See id.

118

Id.at 107.

119 See Aron, supra note 8, at 9-10.
120

See REYNOLDS & FLORES, supra note 2, at 17.

121 See Aron, supra note 8, at 9.
122 Ivan Novikov, Duma Works Out Code of Criminal Procedure, ITAR TASS, Feb.
28, 2001 (quoting Yelena Mizulina, Deputy Chairperson of the Duma Committee on
Law), available at 2001 WL 14768054; see also Orland, supra note 15, at 134 ("The
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reconstruct the Russian judicial system to function more like its
Western European and U.S. counterparts. 123 Prominent among the
goals of the CCP is a desire to elevate the interests of the
individual above the interests of the state, a wholly new concept in
Russian juridical thinking. 124 Similarly, the drafters intended for
the CCP to guarantee individuals a fairer trial, in part by forcing
investigators and prosecutors to professionalize the investigative
process to include the gathering of authentic, legally obtained
evidence. 125 In short, the CCP focuses on protecting the innocent
from erroneous or harassing criminal charges, thus operating in
stark contrast to the Soviet Code of Criminal Procedure'sprior
focus on securing convictions and maintaining authority.' 6
B. Specific CCPProvisions Reallocate PowerAmong
Judges, Procurators,and Defense Attorneys
1. Definitions
Article 5 sets out the definitions of a number of important
Code is 'the most important reform in Russia since the great reform of 1864."') (quoting
Ambassador Vershbow, Opening Remarks at the All Russia Academic Conference on
Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation (Feb. 4,
2002)).
123 See Judith Ingram, New Laws Expand Rights in Russia, DESERET NEWS, July 1,
2002, at A4 ("The goal of this reform is to finally rid ourselves of the atavistic Soviet
juridical machine and maximally approach Western-standard legal procedure."); Steven
Lee Myers, Russia Glances to the West for Its New Code, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at
Al, A6 (quoting Dmitri Kozak, President Putin's Deputy Chief of Staff and the head of
the group who drafted the CCP, as saying, "[A]s of July 1, we will have a criminal
procedure that corresponds to that of world standards and of civilized countries.").
124 See Myers, supra note 123, at A6 (quoting Dmitri Kozak as saying, "[Wle have
made a big step in placing the interests of the individual higher than the interests of the
state.").
125 Ana Uzelac, Deputies Vote to Revamp Courts, Moscow TIMES, June 21, 2001, at
Yet
1, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2001/01/23/003.html.
critics emphasize several parts of the CCP which continue to favor procurators over
defense attorneys: (1) procurators are treated more favorably in the presentation of
evidence; (2) investigators have the right to appoint counsel for indigent defendants; and
(3) procurators can commission evaluations by third-party experts at their own initiative,
whereas defense attorneys cannot do so without the permission of the investigator or the
court. Natalia Yefimova, Court System Gets New Kind of Justice, Moscow TIMES, July
1, 2002, availableat http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6332-6.cftn.
126 See Maksim Chernigovsky, The New Criminal Code Must Be Honored: It Takes
Effect on July 1,KOMMERSANT, July 1, 2002, at 1-2.

2004]

NEW RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The CCP defines a
terms used throughout the CCP. 12 7
"procurator" as "the Procurator General of the Russian Federation
and procurators subordinate to him, their deputies and other
officials of procuracy agencies who take part in criminal
proceedings and have the powers vested in them by the Federal
Law of the Procuracy. ' ' 128 A "judge" is "an official authorized to
administer justice ' ' 129 and a "presiding judge" is "a judge who
hears a criminal case alone or the judge during the hearing of a
criminal case by a multi-member court who controls the court
proceedings.""13 The term "defense counsel" is defined not in
Article 5, but Article 49, and is "a person who, in accordance with
the procedures established by this Code, defends the rights and
interests of suspects and accuseds and provides legal assistance to
them in the course of criminal proceedings.131 Thus, the drafters
of the CCP sought to identify the major participants in the criminal
procedure13 2process by defining their positions at the beginning of
the CCP.
2. Defense Counsel
The CCP revolutionizes the role of defense counsel in Russian
criminal procedure. First, Article 16 guarantees a suspect or
accused the right to a defense and to defense counsel, even if the
The CCP also
individual cannot afford to pay for counsel.'
declares that defense counsel and procurators possess equal rights
before the courts, 134 representing a substantial increase in the
power of defense counsel and a sharp decrease in procuratorial
power. As further evidence of this reallocation of power, Articles
53 and 86 give defense counsel the right to collect evidence and
conduct pretrial investigation personally.13 5 Under the old Soviet
127 UPK RF art. 5.
128 Id. art. 5(31).
129 Id. art. 5(54).
130 Id. art. 5(26).
131 Id. art. 49(1).
132 See id. arts. 5 & 49.
133 Id. art. 16.
134 Id.art. 15(4).

135 Id. arts. 53(1) (permitting defense counsel to gather and present the evidence
necessary to provide legal representation, and to examine and copy the entire criminal
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criminal justice system, defense counsel were merely permitted to
"study" the criminal case file prepared by the procuracy at the
conclusion of the pretrial investigation. 136 In addition, the CCP
does not require defense counsel to possess any special
qualifications or clearance to participate in cases involving state
secrets; instead, defense attorneys need only sign a non-disclosure
agreement. 37
'
3. AdversarialProceedings
Whereas the procurator dominated criminal trials in the Soviet
system, 38 the CCP mandates that judicial proceedings be
adversarial competitions between equals.' 39 Separate and distinct
individuals must undertake the prosecution, defense, and
adjudication of a criminal case, so that a single agency or official
does not control all three functions. 140 The CCP explicitly states
that judges are no longer instruments of criminal prosecution and
forbids the judge from siding with either the prosecution or the
defense. 14 1 Instead, judges are to remain neutral arbiters of the
proceedings, 142 ensuring that the necessary conditions exist for
procurators and defense attorneys to exercise their duties and
rights in an adversarial context. 143 The CCP also mandates that the

case file upon completion of an inquiry or preliminary investigation) & 86(3) (granting
defense counsel the right to obtain documents and objects, to interview consenting
individuals, and to request documents and memoranda from governmental and nongovernmental agencies and associations).
136 Aron, supra note 8, at 11.
137 See UPK RF art. 49(5).
138 See Aron, supra note 8, at 2.
139 UPK RF art. 15(1, 4) ("YronoBHoe cyAtonpo143BOqCTBO ocyteCTBnAeTCA Ha
ocHoBe COCTA3aTeJnbHOCTH cTOpOH."). The translation of the term "sudoproizvodstvo"
(cyUonpon3BoxcTBo) in Article 15(1) is problematic, however, because it is unclear
whether the requirement of adversarial procedures applies to the entire criminal process
or just to court proceedings. Due to the fact that defense attorneys and procurators
continue to possess unequal powers of investigation (despite the increased powers
conferred upon defense counsel in Articles 53 and 86), the term has been translated in its
more limited form to mean "judicial proceedings." Id. art. 15(1), n. 10.
140 Id. art. 15(2).
141 Id. art. 15(3).

142 Aron, supra note 8, at 11.
143 UPK RF art. 15(3).
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procurator be present in court at all times,' forcing procurators to
prepare their cases more thoroughly and further separating the
judge's role from that of the prosecution.' 4 5

Thus, the CCP

radically changes the roles of procurators, judges, and defense
attorneys in the Russian criminal justice system, curtailing the pro-

prosecution bias of the former Soviet system and replacing
it with
46
players.
equal
and
separate
of
process
adversarial
more
a
4. PretrialInvestigation
Under the 1979 Law on the Procuracy of the USSR, the
Procurator General and his subordinate procurators possessed

"supreme supervision over the precise and uniform execution of

laws" by all government and other organizations and by all
citizens. '
That power of "general supervision" included the

power to supervise the execution of the laws by inquiry agencies
and preliminary investigation agencies, the power to coordinate
the activities of law-protection agencies, and the duty to
investigate

crimes

and bring

to justice persons who have

committed crimes."'
The new CCP continues to vest a significant amount of control
over the criminal investigation process in the procuracy rather than
in an independent investigatory body. 4 9 In addition to his duty to
pursue criminal prosecutions on behalf of the State, the procurator
must also supervise the inquiries and preliminary investigations 5 °
144 Id. art. 246(1-2).
145 See Aron, supra note 8, at 11.
146 See id.
147 Law on the Procuracy of the USSR, Vedomosti SSSR, 1979, No. 49, Item 843,
art. 1, amended by Vedomosti SSSR, 1982, No. 49, Item 945, in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON
THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 173 (W.E. Butler ed. & trans., 1983).
148 Id. arts. 28-29.

149 See UPKRF art. 37.
150 Russian criminal procedure involves two types of investigation: an inquiry
(doznaniye) and a preliminary investigation (predvaritel'noye sledstviye). Id. art. 5(6),
n.6. Conducted by the police and/or inquiry officers, an inquiry is a short, simple
investigation that occurs immediately after a crime. Id. An inquiry is the only form of
investigation used for minor offences and is the first step towards a full preliminary
investigation for major offenses. Id. A professional investigator who possesses quasijudicial powers conducts the more intensive preliminary investigations for more serious
cases. Id. The differences between the two types of investigation are reflected in the
distinction, albeit a subtle one, between inquiry officers and investigators in Russian
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Such supervision
carried out by the respective agencies."'
cases to
assigning
investigations,
includes initiating criminal
inquiry officers and investigators, personally taking part in
investigations, and/or issuing binding written instructions to
Inquiry officers and
inquiry officers and investigators.' 52
investigators must obtain the consent of a procurator to initiate a
case or to file any type of procedural motion in a court, and
procurators alone possess the power to recuse and remove inquiry
officers and investigators from a case. 53 Procurators may
countermand the orders of inquiry officers and investigators, order
agencies to take certain investigative actions, approve dismissal of
a case, approve the issuance of an indictment, extend the period of
pretrial investigation, and return the case to an agency for
supplemental investigation.' 54
Nevertheless, the CCP does give inquiry officers and
investigators some autonomy from the procuracy. For example,
all decisions affecting the execution and direction of an inquiry or
investigation remain within the discretion of the inquiry officer or
investigator, respectively, except when other CCP provisions
require procuratorial authorization and/or a judicial warrant.'
The CCP also addresses a potential conflict of interest by
forbidding an inquiry officer involved in a current or former
tactical investigative operation 56 related to the case to conduct a
When conducting a full
later inquiry of the same case. 15
5
8
has the authority to
investigator
an
preliminary investigation,
initiate a criminal case and to determine the appropriate
jurisdiction for the case.' 59 It is important to note, however, that
criminal procedure. Id.
151 Id. art. 37(i).
152

Id. art. 37(2).

153 Id.

Id.
155 Id. arts. 38(2) & 41(3).
156 Although beyond the scope of this Comment, a "tactical investigative operation"
roughly coincides with American sting and undercover operations. For a more detailed
discussion about these operations, see id. art. 89, n.3 1.
157 Id. art. 41(2).
158 See supra note 150.
154

159 UPK RF art. 38(2).
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the CCP gives the procurator the authority to resolve all disputes
regarding investigative jurisdiction.160 In addition, the investigator
can issue binding orders to inquiry agencies to conduct certain
investigative operations and can execute arrest warrants,
subpoenas, and house arrests.16 1 Thus, although the new CCP
more clearly defines the roles of inquiry officers and investigators
in the criminal justice system, they remain instruments of the
prosecution rather than an independent body of neutral
information-gatherers.
5. Search and Seizure
The CCP drastically reduces the ability of the procuracy to
162
conduct searches and seizures according to their own discretion,
resulting in a decisive victory for Russia's legal reformers. 163 An
inspection 64 of a dwelling may occur only upon the consent of the
residents or pursuant to a judicial warrant, and a search and/or
seizure within a dwelling may only occur pursuant to a judicial
warrant. 65 Although an inspection, search, or seizure may be
160

Id. art. 151(8).

161

Id. art. 38(2).

See Masha Gessen, In Russia, Echoes of the Old KGB Going After Foreign Aid
Workers and Others, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 30, 2001, at 8 (stating that these
articles were designed to "divest powers from Russia's prosecutors and invest it in the
country's judiciary... by taking away from the prosecutors the right to issue.., search
warrants"). Compare Law on the Procuracy of the USSR, Vedomosti SSSR, 1979, No.
49, Item 843, art. 29, § 4, amended by Vedomosti SSSR, 1982, No. 49, Item 935, in
BASIC DOCUMENTS ON THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 173 (W.E. Butler ed. & trans., 1983)
("[T]he procurator shall, within the limits of his competence: ... commission agencies of
inquiry to execute decrees concerning... performance of a search, seizure, and search
for persons who committed a crime .... ), with UPK RF arts. 12 (sanctity of the home),
13 (confidentiality of correspondence, telephone and other conversations, and
communications), 182 (grounds for a search), & 183 (grounds for a seizure).
163 Aron, supra note 8, at 10.
162

164 An inspection (osmotr) is a less intrusive search, generally involving a visual
examination in which nothing is disturbed. UPK RF art. 12(1), n.7. Inspections may be
combined with a more intrusive search (obysk) or seizure (vyemka). Id.
165 Id. arts. 12(1-2) & 29(2). Although Article 29 does not specifically use the word
"warrant," it explicitly states that only courts authorize the following: (1) pretial
detention; (2) extension of pretrial detention; (3) commitment of a suspect or accused for
medical or psychiatric evaluation; (4) inspection of a dwelling without consent; (5)
search and/or seizure in a dwelling; (6) search of a person; (7) seizure of financial
information; (8) interception of correspondence; (9) attach property; (10) suspend a
suspect or an accused from public office; and (11) wiretaps. When read in conjunction
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conducted in exceptional circumstances without a judicial warrant,
the investigator taking such an action must notify a procurator and
a judge within twenty-four hours so that a judge may rule on the
legality of the action. 166 Furthermore, the interception of a
person's confidential telephone and other conversations,
correspondence, and various methods of communication as well as
the use of67 wiretaps is impermissible except pursuant to a judicial
warrant. 1
According to the CCP, grounds for conducting a search require
"sufficient information to believe that the instruments of a crime
or objects, documents, or valuables that may be relevant to a
criminal case may be located at some place or in possession of
some person."1 68 Investigators may prevent those present at the
169
location of the search from leaving until the search is completed;
however, such individuals may participate in the search and may
have defense counsel present during the search. 7 ' In addition,
investigators must compile a thorough record of the search
documenting the location, the items obtained, and the methods
used to obtain the items.171
The grounds for conducting a seizure, however, appear
somewhat more stringent: "When it is necessary to seize certain
objects and documents that are relevant to the criminal case and if
the location and the person in possession thereof are known for

with Article 12, which does use the word "warrant," Article 29 is interpreted as requiring
procurators to obtain search, seizure, and arrest warrants. The need to go to court to
obtain a warrant before proceeding with an investigation forces procurators to articulate
some measurable amount of suspicion to justify the issuance of a warrant. The amount
of suspicion required to obtain a warrant is not yet clear.
166 Id. art. 165(5). It is interesting to note that Article 12(2) states that only searches
and seizures in a dwelling require a judicial warrant, whereas Article 165(5) refers to
searches and seizures of a dwelling and searches of a person that may occur in rare
instances without a judicial warrant. Furthermore, Article 29(2) gives the courts the sole
power to authorize the search of a person. The omission regarding searches of the
person in Article 12 is likely a drafting oversight, but it will be interesting to see how this
provision is interpreted in the case law. Id. arts. 12(2), 165(5), & 29(2).
167 Id. arts. 13 & 29(2).
168

Id. art. 182(1).

169

Id. art. 182(8).

170 Id. art. 182(11).
171

Id. art. 182(13).
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certain, their seizure shall be carried out."' 17 2 This section requires
a showing of relevancy of the objects to be seized to a crime and
also requires that the location and possessor of the objects be
known "for certain," which is a high threshold to meet. 173 In
addition, investigators may only seize an individual's financial
74
records (deposits and accounts) pursuant to ajudicialwarrant.1
6. Court-SanctionedArrests and PretrialDetention
Under the new CCP, only the courts may decide whether to
impose pretrial restraint measures and whether to extend a period
of pretrial detention. 175 Article 10 states that no person may be
arrested or otherwise confined in connection with a criminal act
unless the legal grounds 176 specified in the CCP exist. 177 A person
suspected of committing a crime may also be arrested if he is
likely to flee, has no permanent address, has no ascertainable
identity, or if a procurator has filed a motion for pretrial
detention.' 78
Once arrested, "[n]o person may be detained for more than 48
hours except pursuant to a judicial warrant."' 9 Detentions during
172

Id. art. 183(1).

173

See id.

174 Id. arts. 29(2) & 183(4).
175 See Gessen, supra note 162, at 20 (stating that these articles were designed to
"divest powers from Russia's prosecutors and invest it in the country's judiciary... by
taking away from the prosecutors the right to issue... arrest... warrants."). Compare
Law on the Procuracy of the USSR, Vedomosti SSSR, 1979, No. 49, Item 843, art. 29, §
7, amended by Vedomosti SSSR, 1982, No. 49, Item 935, in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON THE
SOVrET LEGAL SYSTEM 173 (W.E. Butler ed. & trans., 1983) ("[T]he procurator shall,
within the limits of his competence: ... extend the period of investigation and
confinement under guard as a measure of restraint in the instances and procedure
established by law .. ")with UPK RF art. 29(2) ("[O]nly a court may make the
following decisions: 1) imposing a pre-trial restraint in the form of incarceration .. . , 2)
to extend a term of pre-trial detention ....
").
176 UPK RF art. 91(1) (stating as legal grounds for arrest the following: a person
caught in the act or immediately after the act, a person identified by eyewitnesses and/or
the victim as the perpetrator, or clear physical evidence of a crime on a person's body,
clothes, in his possession, or in his dwelling).
177 Id.art. 10(1).
178 Id.art. 91(2).

179 Id. art. 10(1); see also id. art. 94(2) ("Upon the expiration of 48 hours after the
suspect is arrested, the suspect shall be released unless pre-trial detention has been
imposed on the person or the time limit on arrest has been extended by a court.").
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80
criminal investigations may last no longer than two months,1
unless the procurator obtains judicial permission to extend the
period of detention for up to six months.' 8 ' A judge may extend
the period of pretrial detention to up to twelve months for
individuals charged with serious crimes 8 2 but only if legal
grounds for continued detention exist and only if the case is
particularly complex. 183 An individual may be detained for up to
eighteen months in truly exceptional cases, but no period of
pretrial detention may extend beyond eighteen months. 184 Any
individual held in excess of85 the statutory detention periods is
entitled to immediate release. 1
Moreover, the CCP introduces the concept of bail to the
Russian criminal justice system. 86 The CCP treats bail as a type
of pretrial restraint measure that can be utilized instead of pretrial
detention or house arrest. 87 Although the incorporation of a bail
option into the criminal justice system represents a novel advance
in Russia's available pretrial restraint measures, the procedure for
implementing bail as the pretrial restraint measure in a particular
case continues to preserve Soviet overtones of procuratorial
supremacy. 88 A court, a procurator, or an inquiry officer or
investigator acting pursuant to procuratorial consent may impose
bail as a pretrial restraint measure. 89 Thus, the procuracy retains
some of its power and discretion to decide upon and impose

180

Id.art. 109(1).

181 Id. art. 109(2).
182 The Code does not define what constitutes a "serious crime." It is possible that
the same classification as that used for determining which crimes may be heard by a jury
will be used. In that case, "serious crimes" include "those in which the defendant could
be sentenced to at least three years in prison." MARK KRAMER, RIGHTS AND RESTRAINTS
IN RUSSIA'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE NEW CRIMINAL

CODE 1 (PONARS, Policy Memo 289, May 2003), available at
http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm0289.pdf.
183 UPK RE art. 109(2).
PROCEDURAL

184

Id. art. 109(3).

185

Id. art. 109(4).

186

See id. art. 106.

187

Id. art. 106(2).

188

See id.

189

Id.
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certain pretrial restraint measures. 190
7. Presumption of Innocence andBurden of Proof
The CCP's approach to the concepts of presumption of
innocence and burden of proof represents a radical departure from
the earlier Soviet treatment of these two issues 91 In the Soviet
criminal justice system, judges assumed that a procurator would
not bring a case to trial unless he had a very good reason to believe
that the defendant committed the crime with which he was
charged. 192 As a result, the vast majority of Soviet criminal cases
ended in conviction, regardless of whether or not the procurator
actually went to court to prove the charges against the
defendant. 93
'
Chapter 2 of the CCP, however, begins with the premise that
one of the purposes of criminal proceedings is to protect
individuals from unlawful or poorly grounded charges and
convictions, 194 elevating the need to avoid the prosecution of the
innocent to the same level as the need to prosecute and sentence
the guilty. 195 The CCP expressly states that an individual is
presumed innocent until proven guilty of a crime as determined by
a final court judgment, thus preserving the defendant's innocence
throughout the appellate phases of the criminal justice process. 9 6
Any doubts regarding the guilt of a defendant must be resolved in
his favor, and a conviction based upon mere supposition will not
be upheld.' 97 The prosecution carries the burden of proving all of
the material elements of the charge(s) against the defendant as
190 Compare id. art. 29(2) (stating that courts have the sole power to impose the
pretrial restraint measures of incarceration or house arrest), with id. art. 106(2) (stating
that courts or procurators have the power to impose the pretrial restraint measure of
bail).
191 See Aron, supra note 8, at 2 (discussing the fact that Soviet judges were expected
to help procurators obtain convictions and thus find defendants guilty).
192 See SOLOMON & FOGLESONG, supra note 32, at 6 (discussing the function of
Soviet judges as merely confirming the evidence contained in the written case file and
imposing sentences).
193 See REMINGTON, supra note 22, at 212, n.13; Aron, supra note 8, at 2.
194 UPK RF art. 6(1).
195 Id. art. 6(2).
196 Id. art. 14(1).

197 Id. art. 14(3-4).
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well as the burden of refuting any arguments posed by the
defense. 98 The imposition of the concepts of presumption of
innocence and burden of proof drastically affects the duties of
Russian procurators, forcing them to collect evidence in a more
thorough manner and better prepare their cases for trial.'99
8. Inadmissible Evidence
For the first time in Russian history, judges have the power to
exclude evidence at trial obtained by a court, procurator, inquiry
officer, or investigator in violation of any of the provisions of the
CCP.2 °° This change represents a radical reallocation of power
between the procuracy and the judiciary, as judges merely
accepted whatever evidence the procurators proffered without
questioning the admissibility of the evidence under the Soviet
system. 20 1 But under the new CCP, Article 75 clearly states that
inadmissible evidence has no legal basis whatsoever and may not
be used to form the basis of criminal charges or as evidence at
trial.2 °2
The CCP contains a number of examples of what constitutes
inadmissible evidence. First, any statements made by a suspect or
an accused outside of the presence of his defense counsel during
the pretrial phases of a criminal proceeding are inadmissible
unless the suspect or accused acknowledges in court that he
waived the right to have defense counsel present. 203 This
provision includes any confessions obtained as a result of torture,
because Article 9 outlaws the use of torture and violence in the
investigative process. 20 4 Second, the testimony of a victim or
witness is inadmissible if it is based upon speculation, rumor, or

198 Id. art. 14(2).

199 See Solomon & Foglesong, supra note 12, at 108 (discussing a modest decrease
in the number of cases won by the State due to poorly prepared cases).
200 UPK RF art. 7(3); see also Aron, supra note 8, at 11 (discussing the novelty of
this provision).
201 See Aron, supra note 8, at 2 (discussing the subservience of trial judges to Soviet
procurators).
202 UPK RF art. 75(1).
203

Id. art. 75(2).

204

Id. art. 9(2).
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hearsay.2°5 Third, any evidence obtained as the result of a
warrantless inspection, search, or seizure of a dwelling, or as the
result of a warrantless search of a person that a court later
determines to have been conducted illegally is inadmissible. 0 6
Most importantly, the CCP includes a catchall provision stating
that evidence obtained in violation of any of the CCP's provisions
will be inadmissible.20 7
9. Double Jeopardy
The new CCP curtails two of the most notorious powers of the
procuracy under the old Soviet regime: the ability to conduct
supplemental investigations 2° and the power to request changes in
criminal sentences. 22009 Prior to the passage of the new CCP, judges
routinely returned weak evidentiary cases to the procurators for
supplemental investigation, forcing defendants to stand trial for
the same crime two or more times. 210 This procedure essentially
gave prosecutors an unlimited amount of time and several
opportunities to obtain a guilty verdict.21 ' Moreover, high-level
procurators had the ability to alter a criminal sentence that they
considered too lenient and that had already gone into legal effect
by bringing a protest in certain high courts, claiming that the
sentence was illegal or unfounded.21 2 Consequently, the finality of
judicial decisions in the Soviet criminal process remained largely
illusory.213
205

Id. art. 75(2).

206 Id. art. 165(5).
207 Id. art. 75(2).
208 Law on the Procuracy of the USSR, Vedomosti SSSR, 1979, No. 49, Item 843,
art. 29, § 8, amended by Vedomosti SSSR, 1982, No. 49, Item 935, in BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 173 (W.E. Butler ed. & trans., 1983) (giving
the procurator the ability to direct and oversee additional investigation conducted by
inquiry and investigation agencies).
209 Id. art. 33 (protest of decisions, judgments, rulings, and decrees of courts by way
of cassation); Aron, supra note 8, at 2.
210 Aron, supra note 8, at 2; Barikhnovskaya, supra note 46, at 100.
211

See Aron, supra note 8, at 11.

212 Law on the Procuracy of the USSR, arts. 33-35; see also Barikhnovskaya, supra

note 46, at 101 (stating that review of a protest to overturn an acquittal or a criminal
sentence is limited to one year after a legal judgment goes into effect).
213 See Barikhnovskaya, supra note 46, at 101.

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 30

The provisions of the new CCP, however, virtually eliminate
the procuracy's ability to conduct supplementary investigations.214
First, Article 237 expressly states that when a court returns a case
to a procurator, the procurator may not conduct any investigative
or take other procedural actions not authorized by that provision.215
A judge may return a criminal case to a procurator upon the
motion of either party or at his own initiative in order to cure
certain enumerated procedural defects in the case.2 16
The
procurator has only five days in which to cure the procedural
violations,1 7 and any evidence obtained after that time limit or
through actions not specified in the article is deemed
inadmissible.218
By contrast, the provisions limiting the procuracy's ability to
alter criminal sentences that have already entered into legal effect
and to reverse acquittals lack a clear prohibition on double
jeopardy. A criminal prosecution 219 must be dismissed if a
judgment or sentence against the accused on the same charges has
already taken legal effect. 2 In addition, a criminal prosecution
must be dismissed if a judge has previously issued a ruling or
order dismissing a criminal case based on the same charges against
the accused. 22 ' Further reinforcing the provisions of Article 27,
Article 405 states that upon supervisory review, a court is
forbidden from worsening the position of a criminal defendant,
either by increasing a defendant's sentence or by reversing an
214

See, e.g., UPK RF arts. 27 (grounds for dismissing a criminal prosecution) & 237

(returning a criminal case to the procurator).
215 Id. art. 237(3).

216 Id. art. 237(1) (listing the following as proper grounds for the return of a case to
a procurator: improperly drawn bill of charges or indictment, improper service of
process, the need to draw up a bill of charges or indictment in conjunction with an order
for involuntary medical treatment, instances of joinder, and a failure to advise the
accused of his rights).
217 Id. art. 237(2).

218 Id. art. 237(5).
219 The CCP distinguishes between a "criminal case" (ugolovnoye delo) and a
"criminal prosecution" (ugolovnoye presledovaniye). A criminal case is filed for every
commission of a crime, regardless of whether a suspect is ever identified. A criminal

prosecution refers to the attempt to convict a particular person of a particular crime. Id.
art. 24(3), n.32.
220 Id. art. 27(l).
221 Id.
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acquittal or dismissal.222 Yet, the CCP grants procurators a broad
right of appeal of jury acquittals in Article 370, stating that a
"judgment of acquittal may be reversed by an appellate court and a
judgment of conviction entered in its place" if a procurator
contests the "validity of the acquittal. 2 23 Moreover, Article 385
permits the reversal of jury acquittals if the violation of criminal
procedure law that occurred interfered with the procurator's ability
to present evidence or affected the contents of the jury
questions.224 Thus, the CCP's treatment of double jeopardy is
unclear and inconsistent, permitting procurators to retain vast
powers of appeal. 25
10. Trial by Jury
The CCP reintroduces into the Russian criminal justice system
an institution that had been eliminated by the Communists: the
concept of trial by jury. 226 Beginning in 2003, Russia began to
phase in twelve-juror panels in its federal courts of general
jurdisdiction in all of its regions. 227 Defendants accused of serious
crimes, such as murder, rape, and terrorism, may now choose to
have a jury rather than a bench trial. 22' The use of jury trials will
help to reinforce the notion of an adversary process between
equals, forcing procurators to better prepare29 their cases and
resulting in verdicts free from undue influence.
IV. Preliminary Results: A Successful Reallocation of Power?
Although the CCP has only been in effect for two years and a
thorough assessment of its implementation will not be possible for
several more years, a preliminary evaluation of its impact on the
222

Id. art. 405.

Id. art. 370; see also Orland, supra note 15, at 148 (discussing the right of
procurators to appeal jury acquittals).
224 UPK RF art. 385.
223

225

See Orland, supra note 15, at 148.

See UPK RF art. 30(2); see also Peter Baker, Russia Tests Juries by Trial and
Error: Courts Slowly Shedding Soviet Model, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2003, at Al
(profiling the implementation of the first jury trial in Moscow City Court).
227 See Baker, supra note 226.
226

228

UPK RF art. 30(2).

229

See

SOLOMON

& FOGLESONG, supra note 32, at 12.
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reallocation of power among judges, procurators, and defense
attorneys is nevertheless possible.2 30 This section will analyze the
effects of the CCP on two levels: first, looking individually at the
implementation of the CCP provisions that specifically redistribute
power among judges, procurators, and defense attorneys, and
second, looking holistically at the broader effects of these
provisions as a general theory of criminal procedure law.
A. Successful Implementation of Specific CCP Provisions
ReallocatingPower Among Judges, Procurators,and
Defense Attorneys?
1. Defense Counsel
Limited access to criminal defense lawyers has greatly
impaired the success of many of the CCP's provisions related to
" ' First, the number of defense lawyers working
defense counsel.23
in Russia remains low, especially in the outlying regions.232 More
importantly, defense attorneys have increasingly become the
targets of police intimidation and coercion, suffering from
beatings and arbitrary arrests. 3 3 Professional associations report
that such abuses occur throughout the country and at all levels of
the judicial system, but the perpetrators are rarely held accountable
for their actions.234 The attacks on defense attorneys are designed
to cause intimidation and to cover up the criminal activities of the
police themselves.235
As a result of the assaults on the already small number of
defense attorneys, the CCP's guarantee of a right to counsel has
been significantly undermined.236 Aside from the possibility of

230 KRAMER, supra note 182, at 1.

231 Id. at 3.
232 See From Russia with Law, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 18, 2002, at 14A.
233 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HuM. RTS., AND LAB., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY

REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2003: RUSSIA

73 (2002), available at

http://www.state.gov/g/drllrls/hrrpt/2003/27861.htm; KRAMER, supra note 182, at 5.
234 KRAMER, supra note 182, at 5.
235 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 233,

73; KRAMER,

supra note 182, at 5.
236 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 233,

supra note 182, at 3, 5.

71; KRAMER,
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physical retaliation, many lawyers refuse to serve as public
defenders because the government fails to pay them for their
services."' Furthermore, most established large law firms do not
engage in pro bono work, with the inevitable result being that
many indigent defendants do not receive the legal representation
guaranteed to them by the CCP and the 1993 Constitution.238
Other abuses that violate the CCP, such as denying defense
attorneys access to their clients239 and locking defense attorneys
out of the courtroom during trial hearings, persist.240 But the most
disheartening factor undermining the CCP's provisions for defense
counsel is the failure of defendants to exercise their right to
assistance of counsel because they feel that such an effort would
be ultimately fruitless. 24 1 For these reasons, it appears that the
provisions of the CCP improving the rights of defense counsel
have remained largely unenforced and face significant hurdles to
implementation in the future.
2. Adversarial Proceedings
Although the CCP has improved the adversarial nature of
criminal trials in Russia, relics of the old Soviet mentality
remain.242 Many judges have quickly adapted to their new role as

237 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTs., AND LAB., supra note 233, 71; KRAMER,
supra note 182, at 3. The Federal Russian Bar, established in January. 2003, undertook
the task of designing a system of indigent defense, but the literature does not contain any
information about the current status of that initiative. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM.
RTS., AND LAB., supra note 233,
71. Nevertheless, this marks an important step in
guaranteeing all Russian citizens a right to counsel.
238 KRAMER, supra note 182, at 3.
239 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB,. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY

65 (2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18388.htm (denying defense counsel access to
their clients by restricting visiting hours in the prisons); see also Susan B. Glasser &
Peter Baker, Prosecution Puts Russian "Rule of Law" on Trial; Billionaire's Case
Invites Scrutiny of Justice System, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2003, at Al 1 (denying the
defense attorneys access to their clients for days after their arrests).
240 Glasser & Baker, supra note 239 (locking defendant Lebedev's defense
attorneys out of the courtroom while the judge and prosecutor discussed the legitimacy
of Lebedev's arrest).
241 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 233, 70.
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2002: RUSSIA

242 See Justicefor Russians, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2003, at A22.
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243
neutral arbiters, especially in the major cities such as Moscow,
but a large number of judges continue to favor the prosecution in
criminal trials. 244 This bias towards the prosecution originates not
only from ingrained Soviet norms, but also from the continued
lack of respect accorded to the judiciary.245 Judges remain
substantially underpaid, which leaves them susceptible to bribes
and intimidation and erects barriers to the recruitment of young,
talented people into the profession.246 In addition, judges must
endure poor working conditions and do not have access to
adequate support staff, forcing them to rely upon procurators for
Despite these continued
information in particular cases. 247
setbacks to judicial independence, the JQCs have begun to actively
discipline their colleagues for violations, thus inserting a degree of
transparency into the judicial system.248 In addition, the new
Academy of Justice recently began operating as a training center
for judges.249
As a result of the problems mentioned in the previous section,
the participation of defense attorneys in criminal trials has not
been as extensive as the CCP envisioned.2"' Defense attorneys
remain largely subservient to the procurators, arguing for reduced
sentences rather than asserting the innocence of their clients.2
Nevertheless, the physical presence of defense attorneys in the

243 KRAMER, supra note 182, at 4; see also Marjorie Farquharson, After One Year,
New Russian CriminalProcedure Code Is Showing Results, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, July 31,

2003, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/07/310703.asp (noting that acquittals in
bench trials have risen from 0.4% to 2%).
244 KRAMER, supra note 182, at 4; see also Baker, supra note 226 (describing the
biased actions of Judge Shtunder in the murder trial of Igor Bortnikov, in which the
judge informed the defense attorneys that doubting the validity of the investigation was
illegal); Anatoly Medetsky, DanilovAcquitted by a Jury, Moscow TIMES, Dec. 30, 2003
("Danilov's jury trial ... was closed to the public, Judge Andrei Kulyabov prevented
some of the defense's witnesses ... from testifying and refused to accept some of the
evidence."), available at 2003 WL 66305773.
245 KRAMER, supra note 182, at 4.
246 Id.; Solomon, JudicialPower in Russia, supra note 52, at 573.
247 KRAMER,

supra note 182, at 4.

248 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 233,
249 Id.

250 See KRAMER, supra note 182, at 5.
251 Justicefor Russians, supra note 242.

T 66-67.
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courtroom has increased, and they are utilizing their new powers
to question the automatic admission of procuratorial evidence.252
In fact, defense attorneys are often better prepared at trial than
procurators, resulting in harsh criticisms of the way procurators
prepare their cases. 253 Thus, despite the lingering presence of a
procurator-dominated process, the concept of an adversary system
of justice has taken root in Russia, and it remains to be seen how
effectively these provisions of the CCP will continue to be
implemented.
3. Search and Seizure
Unfortunately, enforcement of the articles requiring the
acquisition of a judicial warrant prior to conducting an inspection,
search, or seizure constitutes a major exception to the successful
implementation of the CCP. 2 14
Law enforcement officials
continue to enter homes and buildings without judicially-issued
warrants and no reports of government action taken against the
perpetrators exist.255 Police have also prevented individuals from
seeing the actual search warrant and from monitoring the search,
and have failed to make proper inventories of the items seized.256
Reports also state that the government continues to conduct
unauthorized
electronic
surveillance
of
individuals.257
Consequently, the area of search and seizure continues to be
dominated by the procuracy and law enforcement, thwarting the
CCP's attempt to impose some type of judicial oversight of these
actions.
4. Court-SanctionedArrests and PretrialDetention
The provisions of the CCP that require procurators to obtain a
warrant from a judge before conducting an arrest and the
252 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 226 (describing the defense attorneys' objections,
albeit unsuccessful, to the admission of certain evidence).
253 Farquharson, supra note 243.
254 See id.
255 Id.
256 See, e.g., Prosecutors Say Surveillance Equipment Seized in Yukos Search,
PRIME-TASS, July 14, 2003 (discussing alleged violations that occurred during a 16-hour

search of the Yukos oil company's archives), availableat 2003 WL 66198293.
257 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 233,

81.
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provisions that impose stringent limits on pretrial detention have
encountered substantial opposition but have nevertheless been
generally obeyed.258 Indeed, the warrant requirement for arrests
has had a radical impact on the Russian criminal justice system.259
On July 1, 2002, when the new CCP came into effect, virtually no
arrests were conducted in Russia because procurators had already
arrested all of the individuals that they could under the provisions
of the old Code of Criminal Procedure.26" A week later in
Moscow, procurators had submitted only forty-five applications
for arrest warrants, down one-sixth from the roughly 260 arrest
warrants procurators had issued to themselves over the same
period in the previous year.
Admittedly, procurators continued to make some arbitrary
arrests without warrants, but judicial oversight of arrests improved
significantly.262 Six months after the CCP's implementation, the
number of criminal cases instigated by the procuracy fell by 25%
and judges rejected 15% of all arrest warrant applications. 263 By
July 2003, the number of arrests in Russia had fallen by 50%.21
Although it is unclear why the number of applications for arrest
warrants and the number of arrests themselves has decreased so
dramatically, these statistics and the complaints from Russian
258 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HuM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 239,

51.

See id. (noting that the Supreme Court overturned a number of cases because
lower court judges allowed detention of individuals for inadequate grounds and
excessive time periods).
260 Anastasia Kornya et al., Day of Judgment, Moscow NEWS WKLY., July 3, 2002,
at 12, available at http://www.mn.ru/english/issue.php?2002-25-2.
261 Reform of Russian Criminal Code Leads to Far Fewer Arrests (Russia TV
television broadcast, July 9, 2002), available at 2002 WL 23920086. According to
Judge Tamara Razgulova, the court chairperson for the Golovinsky intermunicipal court,
"[T]he very delay is a sign that from now on prosecutors will be more particular about
their arrests." Kornya et al., supra note 260.
262 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 233, 44.
263 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HuM. RTs., AND LAB., supra note 239, 9. By the end
of 2003, courts approved 92% of law enforcement requests for arrests. BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HuM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 233, 44. Of those decisions, 10% were
appealed and 87% of the arrests were upheld by the higher courts. Id. The decrease in
the number of criminal cases initiated by the procuracy coupled with the increase in
judicial arrest warrant approval shows that procurators are becoming more selective in
their arrests.
264 Farquharson, supra note 243.
259
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security organs about the constraints they face under the new CCP
strongly suggest compliance with the arrest warrant provisions.265
Similarly, the courts have strongly asserted their new rights to
make pretrial detention determinations.266 The Russian Supreme
Court has directed all judges to strictly enforce the statutory limits
for pretrial detention outlined in the CCP and it appears that
Russian judges have closely followed this instruction.267 In some
areas, judges have rejected up to 30% of requests for pretrial
detention, and the Supreme Court has reversed several detention
orders imposed by lower courts, which were based upon what the
Court considered to be inadequate grounds.26 8 In addition, judges
have used their power to free prisoners in Chechnya, to release
individuals held in excess of detention limits, and to release
suspects who confessed to crimes without an attorney present.269
During the first six months under the CCP, procurators made no
requests to extend the detention limits and most cases went to trial
within the prescribed six months. 270 Although not all courts fully
enforced the pretrial detention requirements, the overall
27
compliance with this aspect of the CCP has been encouraging. '
Furthermore, active and effective judicial oversight of pretrial
detention has had unexpected and extremely beneficial
consequences for other parts of the Russian criminal justice
system.272 According to human rights advocates, the strict time
limits on detention without access to counsel or family members
as well as the attenuated timeline for bringing a criminal case to
trial have substantially decreased the use of torture and other
265 KRAMER,

supra note 182, at 2.

266 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB.,
267

supra note 239, 1 46.

Id.

268 Id.

51. Between January and May of 2003, the Russian courts received
roughly 37,000 applications for the extension of pretrial detention and the courts
approved 35,000. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTs., AND LAB., supra note 233, 54.
269 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 239,

51.

270 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 233,

54.

271 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTs., AND LAB., supra note 239,

51. But see
Simon Ostrovsky, Courts Deny Bail to Khodorkovsky, Lebedev, Moscow TIMES, Dec.

24, 2003 (citing Khodorkovsky's attorney as alleging that the Besmanny district court
committed numerous procedural violations in denying the defendant bail), available at
2003 WL 66305745.
272 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTs., AND LAB., supra note 233,
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abusive activities by the police.27 3 Moreover, enforcement of the
pretrial detention limits has served to decrease both the number of
individuals held in prison and the length of time they stay in
prison, helping to reduce the intolerable level of overcrowding in
Russian prisons.274
5. Presumptionof Innocence and Burden of Proof
Unfortunately, these imported Western juridical concepts
remain largely just that: under-utilized theoretical concepts. 275 The
very essence of a presumption of innocence is eliminated by the
retention of the use of the Soviet cage.2 76 Throughout the criminal
trial, the defendant remains seated in a large metal cage, sending a
subconscious signal of guilt to the new Russian juries.2 77 In
addition, although the standards of proof2 78 for convictions have

risen 279 and procurators ostensibly have the burden to prove an
individual's guilt, most judges still place a heavy burden on the
accused to prove his innocence. 2" For example, in 2002, higher
courts reversed about 40% of acquittals, whereas higher courts
reversed only 0.05% of criminal convictions. 281 Although the new
CCP arguably forbids higher courts from reversing acquittals in
certain types of cases, this statistic sends a powerful message to
judges, because one of the most important criteria considered in
evaluating judicial performance is a judge's reversal rate. 282 Thus,
the effective implementation of the concepts of presumption of
273 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HuM. RTs., AND LAB., supra note 239, 29 (discussing
how the CCP's provisions may help to decrease the use of torture as an investigative
technique).
274 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTs., AND LAB., supra note 233, 39 (noting that
the SIZO (pretrial detention facilities) prison population has decreased by 46% since
2000). Although beyond the scope of this Comment, an analysis of the effects that the
recently passed judicial legislation has had on the prison system would be insightful.
275 See KRAMER, supra note 182, at 2.
276

See Baker, supra note 226.

277

See id.

At this point in time, unlike the U.S. "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard, the Russian standard of proof is not clearly defined.
279 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 239, 49.
278

280 KRAMER,
281

Id.

282 Id.

supra note 182, at 2.
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innocence and burden of proof has not yet occurred and will likely
not occur until the higher courts send the lower courts clear signals
that they are ready to accept acquittals in criminal cases.
6. Inadmissible Evidence
Currently, there is limited information on whether judges are
refusing to admit illegally obtained evidence in criminal trials.283
Many criminal defendants have attempted to retract their pretrial
confessions, claiming that the police denied them access to a
lawyer, coerced them into making a confession, or that they
confessed in order to avoid the abysmal conditions of the pretrial
prisons.284 Although the incidence of coerced confessions has
decreased since the CCP came into effect, 285 many courts have
continued to reward police for using improper interrogation tactics
and have refused to hold such evidence inadmissible at trial.286
Nevertheless, human rights groups suggest that the provision for
the inadmissibility of confessions made outside the presence of
counsel will further reduce the use of torture and beatings as an
investigative technique.287
7. Double Jeopardy
The provisions of the CCP limiting the occurrence of
supplemental review and double jeopardy appear to be unevenly
enforced. 288 Just two-and-a-half weeks after the new CCP came
into force, the Russian Constitutional Court handed down a
landmark decision 289 in which it ruled that the provisions of the old
Code of Criminal Procedure, which permitted the procurator to
petition a higher court to impose a harsher sentence,29 ° violated the
283 See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HuM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 233,
284 Id.

49.

70.

285 See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 239,
286 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB.,

supra note 233,

29.

49; KRAMER,

supra note 182, at 4; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, JUSTICE FOR EVERYBODY: HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION - TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT (2003), available at

http://www.amnesty.org/russia/torture.html.
287 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 239,

29.

288 See KRAMER, supra note 182, at 5.
289 Russian Constitutional Court Praisedfor Ruling on Appeals Procedure, BBC
MONITORING,

availableat July 17, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library.

290 UPK RSFSR art. 371 (1960) (amended 1972), in SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 30

1993 Constitution.29 ' Citing the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,292 the
Constitutional Court held that the reversal of an acquittal through
the supervisory process is unconstitutional except in truly
exceptional cases. 293 This decision not only hindered the ability of
procurators to overturn acquittals and to alter sentences that have
already entered into legal effect under the old Code, but it
arguably sent procurators a strong signal about how the Russian
courts will interpret the double jeopardy provisions in the new
CCP. 294 Nevertheless, procuratorial distrust of juries has led many
procurators to continue to appeal jury acquittals, 295 thereby
obscuring the true extent of a defendant's protection against
double jeopardy.
On the other hand, since the new CCP came into effect,
procurators and the police have made numerous complaints about
their inability to retry defendants on the same charges.296 Many
have attempted to circumvent the apparent prohibition on double
jeopardy by charging acquitted defendants with new, superficially
different crimes, but higher courts have disallowed blatant
attempts to get around the new provisions. 297 The complaints of
the procurators and police show that some protections against
double jeopardy are occurring, but general enforcement of the

W. Spindler trans.,
1972).
291 Second Thoughts on New Criminal Procedure Law, 54 CURRENT DIG. POSTSOVIET PRESS 5, 6 (2002) (citing Maksim Glikin, Once a Person Has Been Acquitted, He
Can 't Be Sent Back to Jail: ConstitutionalCourt Rules That Prosecutors Were Wrong to
Appeal Excessively Lenient Sentences, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, July 18, 2002, at 2).
292 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, Europ., T.S. Nos. 5, 9, 44, 45, 46, 55, 114, 117, 118, 140.
293 Second Thoughts on New Criminal ProcedureLaw, supra note 291, at 6 (giving
as an example of an exceptional case as one where the court forgets to add the remainder
of an old sentence to the new sentence).
294 See id. But see Orland, supra note 15, at 148 (emphasizing the lack of clarity of
the CCP provisions dealing with prosecutorial appeals of jury acquittals).
295 See, e.g., Medetsky, supra note 244 (stating that the prosecutor would appeal
Danilov's jury acquittal to the Supreme Court on the basis of numerous procedural
violations).
296 KRAMER, supra note 182, at 5.
PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES 203 (Harold J. Berman & James

297 Id.
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double jeopardy provisions remains uneven. 291
8. Trial by Jury
Jury trials have been implemented throughout Russia, but face
many obstacles to acceptance and efficacy. 29 9 The number of
judges and attorneys trained to conduct jury trials is too small, and
most of the crumbling, Soviet-era courtrooms require extensive
remodeling before they can accommodate the new juries.30 ° Jurors
are chosen from voter registration lists, but many prospective
jurors have blatantly refused to serve due to the minimal or nonexistent compensation."' Courts do not penalize prospective
jurors who refuse to serve and the remaining jury pool results in
skewed jury compositions. 3°2 In addition, Russian judges still
retain considerable powers during the trials, including the power to
sentence if the jury has reached a
pronounce the defendant's
33
determination of guilt.
Critics of jury trials condemn the experiment due to its
unacceptably high, in their opinion, acquittal rate of about 20%.304
Although this figure is low by U.S. standards, 305 Russian
procurators believe that such high acquittal rates result in the
release of dangerous criminals.30 6 Moreover, prior to the passage
of the CCP, higher courts repeatedly reversed jury acquittals on
appeal and advised lower court judges on the desired outcome of
particular cases prior to the bringing of an appeal. 3 7 For example,
in 2002, the Supreme Court reversed 32% of the jury acquittals it
considered and, in 2001, the Supreme Court reversed 43% of jury
298 See id.
299 See id. at 6.
300 Id.
301 Id.; see also Baker, supra note 226 (describing the refusal of working-age men to
serve as jurors).
302 E.g., Baker, supra note 226 (noting that the jury was composed primarily of
older individuals, predominantly women, who do not work on a daily basis).
303 See id.
304 KRAMER,

supra note 182, at 6; Baker, supra note 226; Justice for Russians,

supra note 242.
305 Justicefor Russians, supra note 242.
306 See KRAMER, supra note 182, at 6.

307 Justicefor Russians, supra note 242.
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acquittals.3" 8
Nevertheless, jury trials have met with some success in the
criminal justice system and with the public in general.30 9 In the
courtroom, juries have begun to question evidence, forcing the
procurators to account for their conclusions. 30 Because juries
were not historically a part of the Soviet criminal process, many
juries have been able to reach independent conclusions about the
facts of a case, free of the lingering Soviet-era mentalities.311 Most
importantly, "a majority of defense attorneys, defendants, and the
public favor[] jury trials,"3'12 and jurors themselves appreciate the
opportunity to be included in the criminal justice system. 3 13 Thus,
jury trials have obtained a tentative but firm foothold in the
Russian criminal justice system.
B. Successful Implementation of the CCP as a General
Theory of CriminalLaw?
The most significant hurdle to the successful implementation
of the CCP provisions that reallocate power among the judicial
actors is overcoming the deeply-ingrained, cynical view of the
criminal justice system generated by the Soviet experience and
held by almost every Russian citizen.314 Creating confidence in a
criminal justice system historically dominated by the politically
powerful procurators, with no history of an independent judiciary,
and a long tradition of rampant corruption is an uphill battle.315
According to a 2003 Public Opinion Foundation poll, 70% of
Russians surveyed stated that they believed that Russian courts
308 Baker, supra note 226.
309 See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 239,

67.

310 Baker, supra note 226.
311 Seeid.
312 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., AND LAB., supra note 239, 67; see also
Baker, supra note 226 (quoting the defendant Bortnikov as saying, "Only my attorney's
skills and the fact that I had a jury saved me. If it had been like it was before, with just
one judge, nobody would have listened to me.").
313 Baker, supra note 226.
314 See Aron, supra note 8, at 12.
315 See Glasser & Baker, supra note 239; see also Solomon, Judicial Power in

Russia, supra note 52, at 572 ("[Plublic attitudes toward the courts remain ambivalent at
best, and much of the public sees the courts as inefficient and biased, if not also
corrupt.").
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neither operated independently
nor were they guided in their
3 16
actions solely by the law.
The lawlessness and terror under the Soviet regime has created
the perception that criminal justice can be bought and sold.317 For
example, Igor Bornikov explained why he chose a jury trial in this
way: "When there's only one judge, he has his own personal
opinion, and he's always bought and paid for to give a larger
sentence. I wanted more people to participate. It would be harder
to pay off each of them."'3 1 8 When told that U.S. juries must
unanimously find a defendant guilty of murder rather than the
simple majority required in Russia, Bortnikov's astonished
attorney replied, "Then, you only have to buy one., 319 Although
Russian distrust of the criminal justice system is not always
misplaced, because corruption and abuse are still significant
problems, it fails to take into account the improvements that have
occurred over the last decade. 32" The Russian government has just
begun to address this problem by conducting public education
programs to explain the criminal justice process and the rights of
citizens within that process. 321 But until the Russian people are
ready to place their trust in the criminal system as a place where
ordinary citizens can obtain justice, the guarantees of the new CCP
will remain incompletely implemented and the concept of a ruleof-law state will suffer.322
V. Conclusion
This Comment has sought to evaluate the efficacy of the CCP
provisions that reallocate power among Russian procurators,
judges, and defense attorneys two years after the implementation
of the CCP. Although procurators have successfully worked to
316 Baker, supra note 226.
317

See id.

318 Id.
319 Id.
320 See generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HuM. RTs., AND LAB., supra note 233

(detailing the improvements to the Russian criminal justice system and, specifically, the
judiciary).
321 Id. 50 (discussing the creation of the "Public Trust" program).
322 See Aron, supra note 8, at 12 (discussing the need for a popular belief in the
criminal justice system in order for a true Russian Rechtsstaat to emerge).
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undermine several of the CCP's attempts to level the field for
judicial actors, strong enforcement of other provisions has
significantly curtailed the power of procurators in favor of Russian
judges and defense attorneys. It is important to keep in mind that
Russian procurators, judges, and defense attorneys have only just
begun to explore the parameters of the new CCP.323 Therefore, the
ultimate success of the CCP's fundamental reallocation of power
among the procuracy, judiciary, and defense bar depends upon a
number of interrelated factors, the most important of which is
support for reform and strict enforcement
continued government
3 24
itself.
CCP
the
of
First, the government must take further steps to ensure that the
Russian judiciary attains true and complete independence.
President Putin's government has promised to spend $1.5 billion
over the course of three years to develop Russia's judicial
system,3 25 including a 300% increase in judges' salaries,3 26 a
promise which the government must keep. Expenditures on
judicial training, judicial salaries, courtroom safety, and wholesale
remodeling of Russia's derelict courthouses would produce a
number of benefits: enhanced judicial self-esteem, decreased
susceptibility to bribes and outside influences, higher quality
support staff, greater access to sources of current law, and the
attraction of young, talented individuals into the profession. These
hallmarks of a truly independent judiciary would begin to erode
ingrained Soviet perceptions of judicial corruption, replacing them
with greater confidence in the criminal justice system as a whole.
Similarly, the Russian government needs to increase its
funding and support for criminal defense attorneys in order for the
defense to operate as a sufficient counterweight to the stillpowerful procurators. The current number and quality of defense
attorneys is woefully inadequate to meet the new demands of a
right to counsel and jury trials guaranteed by the new CCP.
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324 See Boylan, supra note 8, at 12.
325 From Russia With Law, supra note 232.
326 Alex Nicholson, Legislative Changes Set a Fast and Furious Pace, Moscow
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Government-funded training programs would help to increase the
quality and prestige of Russia's defense attorneys. In addition,
punishing individuals who harass and attack defense attorneys
would send a clear message about the defense attorney's role in
Russia's new criminal justice system as well as establish a credible
commitment towards a rule-of-law state. Finally, a system of
national indigent defense and/or the introduction of pro bono
requirements would help to ensure that the guarantee of legal
representation is upheld.
In addition, some scholars have suggested that the Soviet-style
procuracy be dismantled and replaced with a public prosecutor's
office modeled after a recent Council of Europe paper that details
the functions of a public prosecutor's office in a modern
democracy.327 Eliminating the procuracy and replacing it with
modern public prosecutors' offices would help to dispel the stigma
of injustice and unfairness associated with the old Soviet
procuracy and would reinforce the government's commitment to
criminal justice reform.328
Next, strict adherence to the provisions of the CCP is
important to its efficacy and validity in the eyes of Russian
citizens. Rigid judicial enforcement of the arrest warrant and
pretrial detention provisions should continue and be extended to
the search and seizure provisions. Procurators and police who
violate these provisions should endure harsh repercussions,
including the enforcement of CCP provisions that make illegally
obtained evidence inadmissible at trial. Furthermore, strict
against supplemental
with the prohibition
compliance
investigation and narrow interpretations of the double jeopardy
provisions will entrench the much-needed concept of finality into
Russian jurisprudence.
The effective implementation of the concepts of presumption
of innocence and burden of proof depend largely upon overcoming
deeply-rooted Soviet norms. A trial must be viewed as a forum
for determining the truth rather than as a mere incident to
In addition, Russian trials must truly become
conviction.
adversary contests between equals, presided over by a neutral
arbiter and shifting the burden of proof back to the State.
327
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The most difficult obstacle to overcome, however, is the
average Russian citizen's skeptical view of the criminal process as
a system designed to produce justice. Although procurators
continue to disregard many of the new restraints on their
previously unchecked powers, procurators are also beginning to
relinquish some of their control to other bodies and comply with
the provisions of the CCP. Similarly, judges are developing
greater self-confidence and independence as they begin to assume
their new role in the criminal trial process, despite some latent
abuse and corruption. Although analyses of the criminal justice
system should be accurate, the Russian government needs to place
greater emphasis on the positive improvements achieved thus far.
Most importantly, however, the Russian government, as well as
international supporters, must have patience because such a radical
reversal in perception occurs over an extended period of time and
will likely not begin until Russian citizens can point to more
concrete improvements. This in itself creates a problem, though,
because concrete changes often cannot occur without popular
support for and faith in the system. Consequently, eliminating
entrenched Soviet views of a criminal justice system that provides
anything but justice will likely prove to be the most enduring
obstacle to the complete and successful implementation of the
principles embodied in the new CCP.
Thus, the current attempts to implement the CCP provisions
that reallocate power among procurators, judges, and defense
attorneys represent a sharp break with Russia's repressive Soviet
past and constitute a positive, if only tentative, step towards the
creation of a Russian state that upholds and protects the rights of
its citizens. Although these provisions face many challenges to
their complete implementation in the years to come, the limited
success of their current implementation bodes well for the future
implementation of these provisions specifically and the CCP as a
whole.
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